The closer, the real and relative distance of an organization to a disaster, the bigger the impact on the organizational safety philosophy; whereas, the further, the real and relative distance to a disaster, the lower the impact on safety philosophy and the organizational reaction Toft and Reynolds, Hence, the distance to an event impacts the organizational safety philosophy that defines the fundamental approach to safety Taylor, 25 , and the safety culture that denotes the set of norms and practices within an organization being concerned with minimizing the exposure of individuals to dangerous conditions Toft and Reynolds, From a safety culture viewpoint, the failure to perceive threats to a system's stability represents a poor safety culture Borodzicz, Organizations dealing routinely with high risk technologies, e.
Due to the lives involved and immense costs, a trial and error approach is imprudent in these types of organizations.
There are examples of failure in organizations dealing with high-risk technologies, e. During the analysis of events of the space shuttle Challenger disaster in , Torrance 1 described NASA as an organization too young to understand the factors leading to the Challenger disaster. However, considering the various layers of culture, an issue is to assess the quality and effectiveness of safety culture Borodzicz, Although it should be an obvious goal of organizations to reduce the possibilities for a disaster, some apparently do not.
Factors that influence this organizational behavior can be manifold and include economic and political factors. Additionally, psychological factors determine the willingness for change of safety philosophy. Where an organization does not believe that it was responsible for a disaster, the willingness to change its safety philosophy is limited Toft and Reynolds, However, organizational perceptions of disasters often appear less influenced by history than by frames applied to history, as organizations often attribute desirable outcomes to internal factors, whereas external factors are more often blamed for failures Toft and Reynolds, Ideally, the organizational reaction then gives way for passive foresight.
Passive foresight, in combination with safety by compulsion, gives scope and potential for active learning to take place Toft and Reynolds, Management decrees and legislation may present an opportunity to change individual behavior in a particular situation; however, compulsion alone cannot change the safety philosophy of an organization Toft and Reynolds, Hence, if it cannot be ensured that everybody in an organization attains to rules, legislation can create a false sense of safety.
The Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster is an example, where detailed regulations on operations existed, but were disregarded by personnel Kreps, That said, disasters do not necessarily happen due to rule breaking, but sometimes because existing rules did not cover the conditions that existed prior to the disaster Toft and Reynolds, The discussion shows that safety by compulsion has its limitations; however, it is clearly desirable that organizations, dealing with high-risk technologies, should be regulated by legislation and rules for a structured approach to safety and ensure high standards of operation Borodzicz, Disasters create opportunities for active learning, why do they repeat?
Essay, 12 Pages. Add to cart. Introduction Disasters have adversely affected humans since the dawn of their existence Coppola, 1. Sign in to write a comment. Read the ebook. Are local authorities better placed t Evaluating the Effectiveness of an Ac First Quantitative Measurement of Mot The Level of Utilization and Opportun What Makes Students in the Philippine Creating a Professional Learning Comm Active Learning in English Classes.
Active learning application in physic Learner Autonomy in the Classroom. Man Made Disaster, wie weit greift di Die Rolle und Bedeutung der Logistik Andy Warhols "Disasters Serie". More than 8 million people were crammed in an area about twice the size of New York City.
December was the coldest month that year, and during the first week, London sat under an anticyclone for five days — a temperature inversion of high atmospheric pressure. Warm air trapped colder air on the ground, sealing a lid over the city.
They admitted that 4, Londoners did die from the fog but said the additional 8, actually succumbed to an influenza epidemic. But Londoners in trusted their government. They hoped that such a long fog would never happen again. They hoped it was a fluke caused by a freak weather occurrence. But people continued to die, year after year. If they had only known the truth, maybe they would have elected politicians who might have forced a change.
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